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ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION IN THE INTERPRETATION
OF STATUTES
NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON*
It is familiar doctrine that the interpretation of a statute by the agency
charged with primary responsibility for its administration is entitled to the
respectful consideration of the reviewing court. How much consideration may
vary with the circumstances, including, as Mr. Justice Jackson has said, "the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 1 But all this assumes,
as the foregoing statement indicates, that the ultimate test of the validity of
the administrative interpretation is whether the reviewing court is indeed
persuaded of its correctness. There is another doctrine, of somewhat more
recent vintage, which teaches that there are occasions when the reviewing
court need not be persuaded that the administrative agency's choice of con-
flicting interpretations is right, but only that it is reasonable-occasions when,
as Chief Justice Vinson has said, "we need not find that its constructi6n is
the only reasonable one, or even that it is the one we would have reached
had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings." 2 Concern
has been expressed over this tendency "to treat many issues which, when sub-
jected to adequate analysis, would be seen to be issues of law, as lying within
the discretion of an administrative agency and therefore non-reviewable"; it
has also been suggested that the Administrative Procedure Act, properly
interpreted, should do something to arrest its further development.3 In the
following discussion I shall try to explore the basis of this concern and the
validity of the corrective suggestion.
I
The principle of limited judicial review of certain administrative de-
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
1. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 Sup. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed. 124 (1944).
2. Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143,
153, 67 Sup. Ct. 245, 91 L. Ed. 136 (1946).
3. Dickinson, The Judicial Review Provisions of the Federal Administra live Pro-
cedure Act (Section 10) Background and Effect, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIvE PRO-
CEDuRE ACT AND ADMINIsTRATiVE AGENCIES 546, 582-85 (Warren ed. 1947). See also
BENJAMIN, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION: SOME RECENT DECI-
SIONS OF THE NEv YORK COURT OF APPEALS 1, 12-19 (1948) ;' BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 347-50 (1942); Dickinson, Judicial
Review of Administrative Determinations, A Sumnmary and Evaluation, 25 MINN. L.
REv. 588, 589-92 (1941)'; Note, Administrative Tribunals-Judicial Review of Admin-
istrative Interpretations of Statutory Provisions-Recent Federal Developments, 47
MICH. L. REv. 675 (1949); dissenting opinion of Judge Frank, in Duquesne Warehouse
Co. v. Railroad Retirement Board. 148 F.2d 473, 479 (2d Cir. 1945), rev'd, 326 U.S. 446,
66 Sup. Ct. 238, 90 L. Ed. 192 (1946).
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terminations of questions of law--or mixed questions of law and fact-
probably achieved its greatest notoriety in Dobson v. Commissioner,4 when
the Supreme Court, for the first time, applied it explicitly to review of Tax
Court decisions. Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for a unanimous Court, in
addition to characterizing as "only a question of proper tax accounting" 5 what
counsel and the court below had regarded as a significant question of tax law,
6
also took occasion to express this general admonition:
"It is difficult to lay down rules as to what should or should not be reviewed in
tax cases except in terms so general that their effectiveness in a particular case
will depend largely upon the attitude with which the case is approached. However,
all that we have said of the finality of administrative determination in other fields is
applicable to determinations of the Tax Court. Its decision, of course, must have a
'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in the law. But 'the judicial function
is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved
by the administrative body.' "7
This "reasonable basis in the law" principle of the Dobson case led an uneasy
existence in tax administration,8 until it was finally banished from the field
4. 320 U.S. 489, 64 Sup. Ct. 239, 88 L. Ed. 248 (1943).
5. 320 U.S. at 507.
6. The particular issue presented in the Dobson case was whether the taxpayer
was required to include as income the amount received in settlement of a suit for
fraudulent sale of securities, where the taxpayer had previously sold the securities at
a loss, and treated such loss as a deduction for income tax purposes, but realized no
tax benefit from such deductions. The Tax Court, then the Board of Tax Appeals,
had held that the amount received in settlement was in the nature of capital recovery
and was not subject to tax unless deductions of prior years had actually offset gross
income of those years and had thus resulted in a tax benefit. The court of appeals
held that the amounts received, in settlement constituted income in the year received and
could not be adjusted on account of deficits of previous years. In addition to supporting
this ground, the government contended that if the recovery was in the nature of capital
return, then it was nevertheless taxable in its entirety because the taxpayer's basis was
zero. Mr. Justice Jackson summarized his discussion of these issues when he said:
"We only hold that no statute or regulation having the force of one and no principle
of law compels the Tax Court to find taxable income in a transaction where as a
matter of fact it found no economic gain and no use of the transaction to gain tax
benefit." 320 U.S. at 506.
7. 320 U.S. at 501.
8. See Trust under the Will of Bingham v. Comm'r, 325 U.S. 365, 65 Sup.
Ct. 1232, 89 L. Ed. 1670 (1945); John Kelley Co. v. Comm'r, 326 U.S. 521, 66 Sup.
Ct. 299, 90 L. Ed. 278 (1946). In the Trust of Bingham case, Chief Justice Stone
writing for the Court, said of the issues presented: "They are 'clear cut' questions of
law, decision of which by the Tax Court does not foreclose their decision by appellate
courts, as in other cases, Dodson v. Commissioner, supra, 492-493, although their deci-
sion by the Tax Court is entitled to great weight." 325 U.S. at 371. The Chief Justice
then went on to consider the merits of the various questions presented and resolved
them in the same way as the Tax Court as opposed to the court of appeals. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion on behalf of himself and Justices Jackson.
and Roberts, objected to this method of disposition on the ground that "the manner
in which it is reached is calculated to increase the already ample difficulties in judicial
review of Tax Court determinations." 325 U.S. at 377. Apparently the difference between
the Court's opinion and the concurring opinion was that under the former, the Tax
Court's decision would have been properly set aside if it had gone the way the court
of appeals had decided, whereas under the latter, the Tax Court's decision would not
have been properly set aside, no matter which way it went.
In the John Kellev Co. case Mr. Justice Reed applied the Dobson rule to two
decisions of the Tax Court on the distinction between interest and dividends for tax
purposes, in two slightly different situations, one holding the particular payments to be
1950 ]
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by legislative action. 9 Why it was so unwelcome there is a story in itself,
but cursory examination suggests that the basic difficulty lay in the hydra-
headed character of tax administration, rather than in the inherent weakness of
the general principle. 10 Tax experience may be enlightening as to the con-
ditions under which this particular doctrine is hardly likely to flourish, but
for a rounded picture of its potentialities as well as its shortcomings, we must
look outside the field of tax administration.
One of the leading cases from other fields, upon which M'r. Justice
Jackson relied for the principle of judicial review applied in the Dobson case,
was Gray v. Powell," which involved judicial review of an administrative order
denying an exemption under certain provisions of the Bituminous Coal Act of
dividends, the other interest. Mr. Justice Burton dissented in one of the cases, and
Justices Black and Rutledge in the other. Mr. Justice Rutledge based his dissent on
the ground that even assuming that under the Dobson rule "the Tax Court's judgment
should be accepted whatever way the die were cast, although reviewing courts might
differ on the direction," still, "it would not follow . . . that they are powerless when
the throw is in opposite directions at the same time." 326 U.S. at 533. But if Mr.
Justice Rutledge really accepted the application of the Dobson principle to the particular
problem, but thought the two decisions clearly inconsistent, he should more logically.
have voted to set aside both decisions of the Tax Court on the ground that neither
one had a raional basis [cf. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80, 63 Sup. Ct. 454, 87 L. Ed. 626 (1943)], leaving the Tax Court to go
either way, but the same way, in both cases. If only one of the cases had reached
the Court and the other had been merely called to its attention, the same escape would
not have been so obviously present, but the Court could presumably remand to the
Tax Court with directions to make up its mind which principle it intended to adopt
for the future, and to apply that to the particular case. Presumably the requirement
of a rational basis for decision does not prevent an administrative agency from recon-
sidering and revising its position, even though it is too late to change past decisions.
Cf. Barrett Line v. United States, 326 U.S. 179, 201-02, 65 Sup. Ct. 1504, 89 L. Ed. 2128
(1945).
The difficulties of the Supreme Court in applying the Dobson rule were of course
multiplied in the courts of appeals. See Gordon, Reziewability of Tax Court Decisions,
2 TAx L. Rxv. 171 (1946); Note, 45 MiCH. L. REV. 192 (1946).
9. "The courts of appeals shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions
of the Tax Court, except as provided in section 1254 of title 28 of the United States
Code, in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in
civil actions tried without jury; . . ." INT. REV. CODE § 1141 (a). The previous provi-
sion read: "Such courts shall have power to affirm or, if the decision of the Board
is not in accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the decision of the Board."
Whether, in making the change Congress also materially changed the weight to be
accorded the Tax Court's determination with respect to disputed questions of fact,
presents a nice question as to the difference if any, between the substantial evidence
rule applied to administrative determination, and the "clearly erroneous"
rule applied in the federal courts to the trial judge's findings of fact. See United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95, 68 Su . Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 746
(1948); Wright-Bernet Inc. v. Comm'r, 172 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1949); Stern,
Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis,
58 HAv. L. REv. 70, 112-20 (1944). But see Note, Dobson Rule Abolished, I STAN.
L. REV. 305 (1949). If there is a significant difference, it might be argued that Congress,
by the very manner in which it abolished the Dobson rule, recognized that rule as an
appropriate corollary of the substantial evidence rule; but this would be, in my judg-
ment, an over-simplification of the problem.
10. See Paul, Dobson z,. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57
HARv. L. REV. 753, 841 et seq. (1944); Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on
Tax Administration, 58 HARv. L. REv. 477, 539-43 (1945); Griswold, The Need for
a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARv. L. Rmv. 1153 (1944). Mr. Justice Frankfurter
attempted to meet some of these obiections in his concurring opinion in the Trust of
Bingham case, supra, 325 U.S. at 378.
11. 314 U.S. 402, 62 Sup. Ct. 326, 86 L. Ed. 301 (1941).
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1937.12 This statute provided for administrative hearings on applications for
exemption, followed by opportunity for review in a United States court of
appeals, with the provision that "The finding of the Commission as to the
facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 13 Exemption
was sought under a particular clause which read: "The provisions of this
section shall not apply to coal consumed by the producer, or to coal trans-
ported by the producer to himself for consumption by him." 14 With respect
to the facts themselves, apart from the application of the statutory term, there
was no dispute. An arrangement had been entered into whereby the Seaboard
Railroad leased certain mines from the owners; a contractor selected by Sea-
board simultaneously leased mining equipment on the premises from the
owner; and Seaboard and the contractor also simultaneously entered into a
contract for the mining of the coal by the contractor and delivery to Seaboard
for its consumption. There was no suggestion that the mine operator was not
an independent contractor in the usual common law sense; the issue was
simply whether such an arrangement made Seaboard the "producer" of the
coal within the sense of the statutory exemption. The court of appeals held
that it did and set aside the order; the Supreme Court reversed on the ground,
so far as this particular issue was concerned, that it could not "say that a set
of circumstances deemed by the Commission to bring them within the concept
'producer' is so unrelated to the tasks entrusted by Congress to the Commission
as in effect to deny a sensible exercise of judgment .. ." 15
But the real issue in the Gray case could scarcely be appreciated if atten-
tion were centered exclusively on the exemption clause set forth above.
Whether there was a rational basis for the administrative application of the
term "producer" itself depended upon a broader issue of statutory interpre-
tation; namely, whether the regulatory provisions of the statute authorizing
maximum and minimum prices could be applied to deliveries of coal which
involved no change in its ownership.16 If price regulation under the statute
12. 50 STAT. 72 (1937). [Expired May 21, 1943, 57 STAT. 84 (1943)].
13. Bituminous Coal Act, § 6, 50 STAT. 85 (1937).
14. Id. § 4-II(1), 50 STAT. 83 (1937).
15. 314 U.S. at 413. Mr. Justice Reed established the general outlines of the
exemption when he said: "The separation of production and consumption is complete
when a buyer obtains supplies from a seller totally free from buyer connection. Their
identity is undouted when the consumer extracts from its own land with its own
employees. Between the two extremes are the innumerable variations that bring the
arrangements closer to one pole or the other of the range between exemption and
inclusion. To determine upon which side of the median line the particular instance
falls calls for the expert, experienced judgment of those familiar with the industry."
314 U.S. at 413. Nevertheless, as if to show that the administrative judgment was not
without support in the facts, Mr. Justice Reed added: "The shortness of the leases,
the freedom from investment in coal lands or mining facilities, the improbability of
profit or loss from the mining operations, the right to cancel when cheaper coal may
be obtained in the open market, all deny the position of producer to the railroad."
Id. at 414.
16. The regulatory provision [section 4-II(e)] read: "No coal subject to the
provisions of this section shall be sold or delivered or offered for sale at a price below
the minimum or above the maximum therefor established by the Commission, and the
1950]
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was necessarily limited in its application to sales in the usual sense of the word,
the denial of the exemption served no useful purpose; but if transfers such as
occurred between the contractor and Seaboard were within the scope of the
Act, the denial might well be essential to prevent the development of an obvious
and widespread pattern of evasion. 17 If the opinion of the Court had resolved
this basic question in the same way it resolved the issue of the particular
application of the producer-consumer clause, by reliance upon a principle
of limited review, it might have been justly charged with substituting ad-
ministrative for judicial interpretation of statutes. But Mr. Justice Reed,
writing for the Court, did no such thing; instead, he faced and resolved the
fundamental question with the conventional tools of statutory interpretation,
analysis of language, consideration of objectives, and recognition of the un-
fortunate consequences to those objectives if the more limited interpretation
were adopted.' 8 But even after the resolution of this question, there still re-
mained an area for administrative discretion in passing upon applications for
exemption. Some independent-contractor relationships might be so closely
sale or delivery or offer for sale of coal at a price below such minimum or above such
maximum shall constitute a violation of the code. . . ." 50 STAT. 80 (1937).
17. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts, for himself and Chief Justice
Stone and Mr. Justice Byrnes, took the position that the regulatory provisions were
"concerned only with those who sell or market coal," and did not apply to deliveries
from the contractor to Seaboard. 314 U.S. at 419. This conclusion made it senseless
to deny exemption in any situation where there was no such sale. But since Mr.
Justice Reed concluded that the regulatory provisions did apply to situations where
there was no sale within the usual meaning of the term, it would have been equally
strange to conclude that the term "producer" necessarily applied to a consumer who
received his coal from an independent contractor operating a mine leased by the
consumer. Because Mr. Justice Reed considered the two questions separately and
disposed of the problem of definition first, his opinion seems to make the adminis-
trative determination more significant than it necessarily was. This is not to suggest,
however, that the administrative interpretation of the regulatory provisions may not have
been persuasive, and even decisive, within the ordinary principle of the weight to be
attached to administrative construction of ambiguous statutory provisions.
18. It is true that Mr. Justice Reed also said: "In a matter left specifically by
Congress to the determination of an administrative body, as the question of exemption
was here by §§ 4-I1(1) and 4-A, the function of review placed upon the courts by
§ 6(b) is fully performed when they determine that there has been a fair hearing,
wtih notice and an opportunity to present the circumstances and arguments to tle
decisive body, and an application of the statute in a just and reasoned manner." 314
U.S. at 411. But the contention that the regulatory provisions did not apply was as
much ground for exemption as the claim based more specifically on the producer-
consumer clause, yet the fact that the same procedure was applicable did not deter
the court from passing on the fundamental question of interpretation. Furthermore, it
is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Reed relies upon Shields v. Utah Idaho Central
R.R., 305 U.S. 177, 59 Sup. Ct. 160, 83 L. Ed. 111 (1938), where the Court declined
to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission denying an exemption
from the Railway Labor Act claimed on the ground that the applicant was an "inter-
urban electric railway." It is true that Chief Justice Hughes in the Shiclds case
sustained the Commission on the grounds that it could not be said that its "determination
lacked support or was arbitrary or capricious"; and that "the Commission performed
its duty in weighing the evidence and reaching its conclusion in the light of the dominant
characteristics of respondent's operations which were fairly comparable to those of
standard steam railroads." 305 U.S. at 187. But it is also true that the Chief Justice
called attention to Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 286
U.S. 299, 52 Sup. Ct. 541, 76 L. Ed. 1115 (1932), where the Court had already consid-
ered and rejected the claim that an "interurban electric railway" necessarily meant a
railway that "is operated by electricity and extends between cities." 286 U.S. at 307.
[ VOL. 3
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related to the usual market transaction with which the statute was concerned
as to make exemption dangerous to effective regulation; others might be so far
removed as to make exemption harmless. Within that area administrative
discretion was left free to move, subject only to the requirement that it pro-
ceed along rational, as distinguished from capricious, lines.
The foregoing analysis of Gray v. Powell suggests a pattern which is in
general applicable to several other instances where the principle of limited
judicial reviev of questions of law has been invoked. In National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,19 for example, the question was
whether newsboys were employees within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act. The Board had ruled that they were, and this ruling was at-
tacked on the ground that they were clearly independent contractors within the
accepted meaning of the term. Mr. Justice Rutledge, writing for the Court, met
this argument squarely as a question of statutory interpretation which a re-
viewing court could not dodge the responsibility for deciding. He concluded
that the term "employee" was not used in the Act in contradistinction to the
term "independent contractor," and that the common law distinction between
the two terms was irrelevant to the statutory definition. But this did not neces-
sarily dispose of the case; there remained for consideration whether the Board
was justified in applying the term to the particular situation presented by the
newsboy's relationship to the publishers; this question was resolved in favor of
the Board after recitation of some of the relevant circumstances, on the ground
that "The record sustains the Board's findings and there is ample basis in the
law for its conclusion." 20 Similarly, in Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
21
where a workmen's compensation award was under attack on the ground that
the accident did not arise "out of and in the course of employment," Mr. Jus-
tice Murphy rejected the contention that the usual common law test of con-
trol by the employer over the employee's conduct was the decisive factor.
22
With that argument out of the way, it remained only to. determine that the
19. 322 U.S. 111, 64 Sup. Ct. 851, 88 L. Ed. 1170 (1944).
20. 322 U.S. at 132. Mr. Justice Rutledge summarizes his own consideration of
the statutory interpretation problem when he says: "In this light, the broad language
of the Act's definitions, which in terms reject conventional limitations on such concep-
tions as 'employee,' 'employer,' and 'labor dispute,' leaves no doubt that its appli-
cability is to be determined broadly, in doubtful situations, by underlying economic
facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously established legal classifica-
tions." Id. at 129. Mr. Justice Roberts draws the issue sharply in his dissenting
opinion when he says: "There is a general and prevailing rule throughout the Union
as to the indicia of employment and the criteria of one's status as employee. Unques-
tionably it was to this common, general, and prevailing understanding that Congress
referred in the statute. . . ." Id. at 136.
21. 330 U.S. 469, 67 Sup. Ct. 801, 91 L. Ed. 1028 (1947).
22. "Indeed to impart all the common law concepts of control and to erect them
as the sole or prime guide for the Deputy Commissioner in cases of this nature would
be to encumber his duties with all the technicalities and unrealities which have
marked the use of those concepts in other fields." 330 U.S. at 481. See, too, Voehl v.
Indemnity Ins. Co'., 288 U.S. 162, 169, 53 Sup. Ct. 380, 77 L. Ed. 676, 87 A.L.R. 245




peculiar facts of the case, as found by the Commissioner, provided a rational
basis for the conclusion. With regard to both cases it may be fairly said that
the Court exercised an independent judgment with respect to the only general
issue of statutory interpretation presented, even though the resolution of that
issue resulted in leaving to the administrative agency a considerable measure
of discretion to further develop the content of the term within limits only
vaguely suggested.
The opinion of Chief Justice Vinson in Unemployment Compensation
Commission of Alaska v. Aragon 23 does not yield so easily to the same analysis.
The Commission had held certain claimants ineligible to receive benefits during
a period of disqualification provided for by the statute if "the Commission finds
that his total or partial unemployment is due to a labor dispute which is in active
progress at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was
last employed .... ," 24 The claimants had previously been employed by salmon
canneries; negotiations between their union and the canneries had failed to
result in an agreement to cover the seasonal operations normally undertaken;
and, as a result, the contemplated expeditions had been abandoned for the
season. The claimants contended that there was no "labor dispute in active
progress" after the so-called deadline dates when the expeditions were called
off because it was considered too late in the season for profitable operations 3 5
The Commission, on the other hand, viewed a "dispute as 'active' during the
continuance of a work stoppage induced by a labor dispute." 26 Assuming the
facts to accord with the claimants' assertion, the Chief Justice sustained the
Commission's position on the ground that it "might reasonably conclude that
the unemployment resulting from such work stoppage is not of the 'involuntary
nature' which the statute was designed to alleviate, as indicated by the state-
ment of public policy incorporated in the Act by the Territorial Legisla-
ture." 27
The foregoing statement, taken together with the general emphasis of
the opinion on the limited nature of judicial review in this type of case, sug-
gests that the Court, confronted with two fundamental and conflicting in-
terpretations of the phrase "dispute in active progress," accepted the
Commission's interpretation simply because it could not be deemed "irrational
or without support in the record." The question presented in the Aragon case,
comparable to the fundamental questions presented and decided in the Gray,
23. 329 U.S. 143, 67 Sup. Ct. 245, 91 L. Ed. 136 (1946).
24. 329 U.S. at 148.
25. The Compensation Referee had apparently adopted this position, finding that
there was a labor dispute in active progress from the opening of the season until the
deadline dates, but not thereafter. 329 U.S. at 148. The Commission, however, had
held that "a labor dispute was in active progress throughout the entire eight-week
statutory period of disqualification beginning with the opening of the season in each
locality." 329 U.S. at 149.




Hearst and Cardillo cases, was whether a dispute was to be regarded as in
active progress so long as it could be fairly called the cause of the unemploy-
ment, or only so long as there was a possibility that settlement of the dispute
would provide employment. In choosing between the two competing interpre-
tations, the Commission's view might well be given decisive weight, assuming
that both were permissible under statutory language and that no more persua-
sive considerations, either in legislative history or in practical consequences,
were forthcoming clearly to overbalance the Commission's view. If this is what
the Chief Justice meant to say, he was far from explicit in saying it. If, on the
other hand, the Chief Justice meant to shift to the Commission the authority
and responsibility for the choice, merely on the ground that he could conceive
of a reasonable man's deciding either way, he rendered the principle of limited
review peculiarly susceptible to the attacks which have been levied upon it.
In Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Agnew, 28 the
question of proper application of the principle under discussion is highlighted
by the different approaches adopted in the opinion of the Court, by Mr. Justice
Douglas, and in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge for himself and
Mr. Justice Frankfurter. The administrative action under review was an order
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System removing from office
certain bank directors on the ground that they were associated with a partner-
ship which was, within the meaning of the statute, "primarily engaged in the
issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution.., of stocks, bonds,
or other similar securities." 29 The court of appeals had set aside the Board's
order on the ground that since underwriting did not by any standard consti-
tute the chief, principal or major portion of its business, the partnership could
not properly be regarded as "primarily engaged" in such business. The Board
contended that the statute did not require a finding that underwriting was the
chief or principal business of the partnership but that it was sufficient if under-
writing constituted a significant or substantial part of the business. The Court
sustained the Board, saying that, since as a matter of English usage the words
"primarily engaged" were susceptible of such construction, and since as a mat-
ter of fact the apparent objectives of the particular provision would be defeated
if the interpretation of the court of appeals were adopted, the Board's view was
"not only permissible but also more consonant with the legislative purpose." 30
The opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge, on the other hand, tried to make, as clear
as words can make, so fine a distinction that the concurrence of himself and
Mr. Justice Frankfurter was based not upon an "independent judicial determi-
nation of the question presented on the merits" but upon the proposition that
the Board's "judgment should be conclusive upon any matter which, like this
28. 329 U.S. 441, 67 Sup. Ct. 411, 91 L. Ed. 408 (1947).'29. Banking Act of 1933, as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 78 (1945).
30. 329 U.S. at 447.
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one, is open to reasonable difference of opinion." The reason is that "Their
specialized experience gives them an advantage judges cannot possibly have,
not only in dealing with the problems raised for their discretion by the system's
working, but also in ascertaining the meaning Congress had in mind in pre-
scribing the standards by which they should administer it." 31
Here, I submit, Justices Rutledge and Frankfurter come dangerously
close to running a good principle into the ground. It is true that the Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System have a familiarity with the operation of
the system and a closeness to the formulation of legislation affecting it, and
that this gives them an advantage in appreciating the objectives of such legis-
lation. But the same may be said of the Treasury with regard to tax legisla-
tion, the Administrator with regard to the Fair Labor Standards Act, and many
other administrative agencies whose interpretations have not as yet been ac-
corded the limited review under consideration. Their interpretations have, it
is true, been accorded respectful consideration, but there has been no sugges-
tion that their validity was not being tested by the independent judgment
of the court, except within a very limited field, soon to be discussed. It is also
true that the Board had special knowledge of such facts as that, if the interpre-
tation of the court of appeals were adopted, the prohibition would apply to no
one; but this knowledge was available to a reviewing court through the medium
of the Board's opinion and was properly used by the Court in exercising an
independent judgment with respect to the meaning of the statute. Finally,
resolution by the Court of the interpretative question presented in the Ageww
case did not by any means deprive the Board of an area of discretion for the
exercise of its judgment-a discretion which Congress apparently intended
to confer, irrespective of which of the competing interpretations was adopted.
If the words, "primarily engaged," implied the test of chief or principal busi-
ness, there would unquestionably be problems of difficulty and doubt to be
solved in applying that standard, even to undisputed facts. If, on the other
hand, "primarily" is equivalent to "substantially," there is an even wider area
of discretion within which the Board must still exercise a rational judgment in
applying the statutory standard to the facts. But it is quite another matter to
suggest that even though the words "primarily engaged" are susceptible of
being read as the equivalent of "substantially," and that is the only meaning
that will make sense out of the provision in its statutory context, the Board
was, nevertheless, granted discretion by Congress to interpret it otherwise, and
in so doing to render the provision entirely futile.3 2 I recognize that if the
31. 329 U.S. at 450.
32. A comparable problem was presented in United States v. Carolina Freight
Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 62 Sup. Ct. 722, 86 L. Ed. 971 (1942), where the Court
was considering an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission under the so-called
grandfather clause of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 granting a certificate of con-
venience and necessity restricted to certain articles and certain routes. The Court
expressed "doubts" as to the validity of these restrictions on the ground that they
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Board did so interpret the statute, the Court would never have to face the
question, since there would be no private party to present it, yet it seems to me
that the Board would be justly chargeable with error in construction of the
statute, or with an abuse of its discretion in failing to enforce it, even though
only the public or a vigilant Congressional committee could complain.
Of course, it requires no great sophistication to suspect that the rational-
basis rule of statutory interpretation is not really likely to impede a court in
substituting its own judgment for that of an administrator when it is satisfied
that the administrative judgment is wrong. In Social Security Board v.
Nierotko,33 for example, the question was whether back-pay awarded by the
National Labor Relations Board was to be treated as "wages" under the
Social Security Act.34 "Wages" was defined under that Act as "all remunera-
tion for employment"; "employment" was defined as "any service, of whatever
nature, performed within the United States by an employee for his em-
ployer." 35 The Social Security Board, after hearing in accordance with the
statute, held that the back-pay award did not constitute wages under the statute.
In appropriate statutory proceedings to review this order, the district court
sustained the Board's decision, the court of appeals reversed the district court,
and the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. Mr. Justice Reed was
at some pains to explain why the principle of the Hearst Publications case and
Gray v. Powell did not require acceptance of the administrative interpretation.
He conceded that the Social Security Act, and the other acts, were comparable
in that "the administrators . . . were given power to reach preliminary con-
clusions as to coverage in the application of the respective acts." 36 So too he
noted that "Each act contains a standardized phrase that Board findings sup-
ported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive." And finally "The Social
Security Board and the Treasury were compelled to decide administratively,
whether or not to treat 'back-pay' as wages; and their expert judgment is
entitled, as we have said, to great weight." 37 Nevertheless, "Administrative
might have been based on an erroneous interpretation of the statutory standard requiring
prior "bona fide operation as a common carrier,'"-to wit, that the certificate should
properly be limited to the particular articles carried before the statute, even though
there was a holding out or a general undertaking to transport other articles whenever
the opportunity appeared. Because of these doubts, the Commission's order was set
aside with indications that the same order might subsequently be sustained if sunported
by findings consistent with the Court's interpretation of the statutory standards. Mr.
Justice Jackson, for himself and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissented, partly on the ground
that the decision was inconsistent with the principle of Gray v. Powell. Id. at 490. Cf.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65 Sup. Ct. 1490, 89 L. Ed. 2051
(1945).
33. 327 U.S. 358, 66 Sup. Ct. 637, 90 L. Ed. 718 (1946).
34. 49 STAT. 620, 42 U.S.C.A. § 301 (1943).
35. Social Security Act § 210, 42 U.S.C.A. § 409 (1943).
36. 327 U.S. at 368.
37. Mr. Justice Reed also noted that: "The validity of regulations is specifically
reserved for judicial determination by the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939,
§ 205(g)." 327 U.S. at 368. But the section as a whole does not appear to provide a
different standard of review from that applied in Gray v. Powell, and I do not under-
stand Mr. Justice Reed as so suggesting.
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determinations must have a basis in law and must be within the granted au-
thority"; and "the Board's interpretation of this statute to exclude back pay
goes beyond the boundaries of administrative routine and the statutory
limits." 38 In terms of the wisdom of the result the Court was doubtless fortified
by the recommendation of the Social Security Board itself that the statute be
amended so as to include back-pay awards under the National Labor Relations
Act and similar state statutes.3 9 But Mr. Justice Reed hardly attempted to show
that there was no rational basis in the statute for the Board's conclusion. In a
concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, apparently bothered by the ques-
tion, undertook-in my judgment quite unsuccessfully-to establish that "it
is a plain disregard of the law for the Social Security Board not to include
such payments among the employee's wages." 40
It may be suggested, however, that the Nierotko decision indicates that
the Court is not so likely to be impressed by an administrative interpretation
which is reached only because the statutory language is thought to require
it, even though the result, in the agency's own judgment, ill-comports with
the statutory pattern and objectives. To the extent that this is an appropriate
qualification on the rational basis rule, would it not be more accurate to say
that when conflicting interpretations of a statutory provision are permissible
under the language itself, and the agency charged with administration chooses
the one which in its judgment will best accord with statutory policy, the
court will accept that construction if there appears to be a rational basis for
the administrative choice? But if this is what the principle really means, why
should it not be generally applicable to responsible administrative interpreta-
tions irrespective of whether they involve specific applications of broad statutory
terms by orders issued in particular proceedings? Or is there something more
implicit in the rational basis rule than the resolution of statutory ambiguity
by reliance upon administrative appreciation of practical consequences? And
if there is something more, is it fairly described by saying: "When Congress
establishes an administrative agency and lays down general standards for it
38. 327 U.S. at 369.
39. Id. at 370.
40. Id. at 371. In order to establish his proposition that "wages" under the Social
Security Act, as a matter of law, and beyond all reasonable doubt, included back-pay
awards. Mr. Justice Frankfurter relied upon the propositions that, "When the employer
is liable for back pay, be is so liable because under the circumstances, though he has
illegally discharged the employee, he still absorbs his time" [citing Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177, 61 Sup. Ct. 845, 85 L. Ed. 1271
(1941)1, and that this is fundamentally the same as "the ordinary situation of employ-
ment in a 'stand-by capacity'" [citing United States v. Local 807, 315 U.S. 521, 62
Sup. Ct. 642, 86 L. Ed. 1004 (1942)]. This strikes me as a tour de force which, aside
from blithely ignoring the fact that the ordinary situation of employment in a stand-by
capacity involves an obligation to remain available for work, also relies upon a rather
doubtful interpretation of one statutory phrase-"payment of wages by a bona fide
employer to a bona fide employee" in the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act-to establish
that a somewhat similar interpretation of a different phrase in a different statute is
clearly required beyond all peradventure. Cf. dissent of Chief Justice Stone, 315 U.S. at 539.
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to follow, the agency has the function of filling in the interstices which have
been deliberately left open"? 41 Before considering the validity of this sugges-
tion I would like to turn for a moment to administrative interpretations em-
bodied in general regulations.
II
In Fishgold v. Sullivan Corporation,42 Mr. Justice Douglas in rejecting,
on behalf of the Court, an administrative interpretation by the Director of Se-
lective Service, said: "But his rulings are not made in adversary proceedings
and are not entitled to the weight which is accorded interpretations by admin-
istrative agencies entrusted with the responsibility of making inter partes
decisions." 43 In support of this statement Mr. Justice Douglas refers to Skid-
More v. SUwift & Co.,44 and particularly to a part of the opinion where Mr.
Justice Jackson, speaking of administrative interpretations under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, said: "The rulings of this Administrator are not reached
as a result of hearing adversary proceedings in which he finds facts from evi-
dence and reaches conclusions of law from findings of fact. They are not of
course conclusive .... ," 45 It is interesting to note, however, that in the Skid-
more opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson went on to say: "The fact that the Admin-
istrator's policies and standards are not reached by trial in adversary form
does not mean that they are not entitled to respect. This Court has long given
considerable and in some cases decisive weight to Treasury Decisions and in-
terpretative regulations of the Treasury and of other bodies that were not of
adversary origin." 46 These statements reflect an awareness of some delicate
shades of meaning with respect to the weight of administrative decisions. In-
terpretations issued as general statements are said not to be entitled to as much
weight as those evolved in adversary proceedings. But there is also the sug-
gestion that general Treasury interpretations are of considerable and "some-
times decisive weight." Does this mean that there are distinctions to be drawn
between regulations, and that some interpretative regulations are entitled to
the same weight as interpretations in adversary proceedings?
The distinction between different types of Treasury Regulations which
stands out most sharply and has the closest bearing on the problem discussed
above, is the distinction between regulations issued only under the general
grant of authority to "prescribe and publish all needful rules and regulations
for the enforcement of this title," 47 and regulations issued under particular
41. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative
Analysis, 58 H~Auv. L. REV. 70, 106 (1944).
42. 328 U.S. 275, 66 Sup. Ct. 1105, 90 L. Ed. 1230 (1946).
43. 328 U.S. at 290.
44. 323 U.S. 134, 65 Sup. Ct 161, 89 L. Ed. 124 (1944).
45. 323 U.S. at 139.
46. Id. at 140.
47. INT. REV. CODE §§ 3791(a), 62.
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statutory provisions which require such regulations for their implementation.48
An example of the latter is the depletions section of the Internal Revenue
Code, which, after providing for "a reasonable allowance for depletion and for
depreciation of improvements, according to the peculiar conditions in each case"
goes on to provide "such reasonable allowance in all cases to be made under
rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Commissioner, with the approval
of the Secretary." 49 In Douglas v. Commissioner,0 speaking of this section,
Mr. Justice Reed said: "As Congress obviously could not foresee the multi-
farious circumstances which would involve questions of depletion, it delegated
to the Commissioner the duty of making the regulations." 51
The Douglas case itself is complicated by the fact that re-enactment of the
statute after issuance of the regulations is used as an argument in support of
their validity. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Mr. Justice Reed is careful
to say, not that re-enactment indicates Congressional adoption of the regula-
tions, but rather that it "evidences that subsections 23(m)-10(b) and (c)
[the regulations involved] are within the rulemaking authority which was in-
tended to be granted the Commissioner." 52 Thus he treats the regulations in
a manner consistent with the usual treatment of the validity of so-called
quasi-legislative rules of administrative agencies, 5 3 recognizing an area of dis-
cretion which may permit a valid change in the regulations even after re-en-
actment of the statute has been used as one of the grounds for sustaining
them.54 If this is a fair statement of the nature of the depletion regulations,
48. See Davis, Admzinstrative Rules-Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive,
57 YALE L.J. 919, 928-34 (1948); Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil
Case, 40 COL. L. REV. 252 (1940); Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regu-
lations Under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 556, 558 (1940).
49. Ir. Rav. CODE § 23(m).
50. 322 U.S. 275, 64 Sup. Ct. 988, 88 L. Ed. 1271 (1944).
51. 322 U.S. at 281.
52. Id. at 281.
53. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge, for himself and Mr. Justice
Murphy, is also consistent with this view, even though it would hold the regulation
invalid.
I am not suggesting that the distinction between interpretative and legislative
regulations under the Internal Revenue Code is crystal clear either in definition or in
effect. Cf. Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Comm'r, 314 U.S. 326, 62 Sup. Ct. 272,
86 L. Ed. 249 (1941), where the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas indicates that regu-
lations issued only under the general authority of section 62 or section 3791 interpreting
a broad statutory phrase may be treated with practically the same respect as regulations
issued to implement a section which explicitly requires their issuance. Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, which makes such a distinction necessary for the
purposes of section 4, it seems reasonable to conclude that legislative regulations are
those which are required to put a statutory provision into operation, while interpretative
regulations, whatever their weight as guides to meaning, are not essential to the applica-
tion of the statutory provision. Under this view the regulations involved in the Textile
Mills case would be interpretative, but those in the Douglas case legislative.
54. In this connection compare Gillespie-Roger-Pyatt Co. v. Bowles, 144 F.2d 361
(Emergency Ct. App. 1944), when the court in sustaining a price regulation also
accepted as valid rather specific administrative standards for price-fixing which had
been evolved by the Administrator and which had been called to the attention of
appropriate committees of Congress while extension of the Emergency Price Control
Act was under consideration. But note also that this did not deter the Administrator
from making significant changes in those pricing standards when the end of the war
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it may also be noted that Congress might have chosen to delegate to adminis-
trative authority the responsibility for determining "a reasonable allowance
for depletion and depreciation of improvement, according to the peculiar con-
ditions in each case," by providing for hearings and determinations in par-
ticular cases, rather than by general regulation. In tax administration the mul-
titude of cases and the time factor may make the particular order approach
impracticable, but that does not suggest an essential difference in the two
types of delegation, either from the standpoint of delegation of discretionary
authority or the standard of judicial review.
Another example which serves to illustrate the point that I have in mind
is Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products Ic., 55 which concerned a regulation
issued by the Administrator under the Fair Labor Standards Act to effectuate
the exemption provided for in that Act with respect to employees "within the
area of production (as defined by the Administrator), engaged in... canning
of agricultural . .. commodites for market." 56 The Court, by a closely di-
vided vote, held that the regulation was invalid insofar as it made one of the
determining factors of the exemption the number of employees engaged in a
particular plant, as distinguished from "drawing the geographic lines." 57 But
although the Court was divided on the question whether inclusion of this par-
ticular factor was within the Administrator's authority, it is clear that the entire
Court, with the possible exception of Mr. Justice Roberts, agreed that the
Administrator had been granted room for the exercise of discretion in de-
termining the exact meaning to be attributed to the term "area of produc-
tion." 58 Thus Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking for the Court said:
"The textual meaning of 'area of production' is thus reinforced by its context:
'area' calls for delimitation of territory in relation to the complicated economic factors
that operate between agricultural labor conditions and the market of enterprises
concerned with agricultural commodities and more or less near their production. The
phrase is the most apt designation of a zone within which economic influences may
be deemed to operate and outside of which they lose their force. In view, however,
of the variety of agricultural conditions and industries throughout the country, the
bounds of these areas could not be defined by Congress itself. Neither was it deemed
in Europe brought a significant change in economic conditions. See ECKERT, PROBLEMtS
IN PRICE CONTROL: PRICING STANDARDS (Hist. Reps. in War Adm'n 1947). Thus the
specific standards were regarded by the Administrator, not so much as interpretation
of the statute, as an exercise of discretionary authority, to formulate more specific
standards for his own guidance, within the broad framework of the delegation.
55. 322 U.S. 607, 64 Sup. Ct. 1215, 88 L. Ed. 1488 (1944).
56. Fair Labor Standards Act § 13(a) (10), 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a) (10) (1947).
57. 322 U.S. at 616.
58. Mr. Justice Rutledge, in his dissenting opinion, says: "It follows necessarily that
the Administrator's power is discretionary and the important questions are to what
extent and in what manner may his discretion work." 322 U.S. at 629. Mr. Justice
Roberts, however, says: "I construe the word 'define,' in this context, to mean 'ascer-
tain the facts and announce the result of such ascertainment.'" 322 U.S. at 624. It is
also noteworthy that although Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Rutledge agree
that there is an area of discretion and disagree as to what the bounds of that discretion
are, they have no difficulty in isolating the particular issue of statutory interpretation
which the Court is called upon to determine, by exercise of its own independent judgment.
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wise to leave such economic determination to the contingencies and inevitable diver-
sities of litigation. And so Congress left the boundary-making to the experienced
and informed judgment of the Administrator. Thereby Congress gave the Admin-
istrator appropriate discretion to assess all the factors relevant to the subject matter,
that is, the fixing of minimum wages and maximum hours." GO
Again there appears no compelling reason which should prevent Congress
from delegating the same scope of authority, with the same elements of judg-
ment or discretion, to the Administrator, to be exercised however after the
manner involved in Gray v. Powell, by passing on individual applications for
exemptions, with only the general standard "area of production" to guide his
deliberations.60
Although these two methods of delegating authority to make more specific
general statutory provisions have in general been treated as alternatives, there
is no reason why, in an appropriate case, they should not be combined so as
to supplement one another in the effectuation of the statutory objective. One
of the most obvious examples of at least the possibility of such a combination
may be found in the work of the Federal Trade Commission under the Federal
Trade Commission Act itself. The only substantive provision of the statute is
that which states: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." 61
Immediately following this provision the statute continues: "The Commission
is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons . . .from using unfair
methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce." The principal means provided for carrying out this responsibil-
ity are the familiar cease-and-desist orders of the Commission issued after
complaint and opportunity for hearing. The statute further provides, however,
that "The Commission shall also have power ... to make rules and regulations
for the purpose of carrying out the provisions" of various sections, including
the section forbidding unfair methods of competition and directing the Com-
mission to prevent them.62 Apparently pursuant to this grant of authority,
the Commission has issued regulations, in the form of trade practice con-
ference rules, which define practices in particular industries deemed by the
Commission to be unlawful under the statutes which it administers. 6
59. 322 U.S. at 614.
60. In view of this analysis it would also seem appropriate to classify the regulations
involved in the Addison case as legislative rather than interpretative for the purposes
of section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act. They meet the test suggested above
in that their issuance was required for the operation of the exemption provision.
Furthermore, they involve that element of discretion which was apparently the main
reason for the hearing procedure embodied in section 4. This is a retraction of a
previous ill considered suggestion. See Nathanson, Some Comments on the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 41 ILL. L. REV. 368, 383 n.39 (1946).
61. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1941).
62. Id. § 6(g), 15 U.S.C.A. § 46(g) (1941).
63. See Trade Practice Conference Procedure, 16 CODE FED. REGs. § 2.28 (1949);
and, for example, Trade Practice Conference Rules for Southern Hardware Jobbers,
16 id. §§ 18.1-18.9.
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It is common. knowledge that the Supreme Court evidenced a chilling
attitude toward the Commission's early efforts to breathe vitality into the phrase
"unfair methods of competition." Although the legislative history of the statute
indicated that the meaning of the phrase was to be developed by the Commis-
sion in the light of its continual study of, and experience with, the problem of
maintaining both fair and vigorous competition free from the practices which
tend toward monopoly,64 the Court was nonetheless emphatic in asserting that
the ultimate meaning of the phrase was a question of law to be determined
by the courts; and the actual practice left no doubt that this meant the inde-
pendent judgment of the Court.65 In recent years the Court has more explicit-
ly recognized that the statutory words "unfair methods of competition" are
not to be taken as synonomous with the common law concept of unfair compe-
tition, and has also been more inclined to emphasize the weight to be accorded
to the Commission's judgment as to what constitutes an unfair method of com-
petition.6 There has, however, as yet been no explicit adoption, in review of
a Commission order, of the principle that the order should be sustained if "it has
a rational basis in fact and is not forbidden by law." Yet if there is place for
the application of this principle in the field of statutory interpretation, the
Federal Trade Commission Act would seem to be as appropriate as any. The
Commission must exercise an "experienced and informed judgment" with re-
spect to many "complicated economic factors" as Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said of the Administrator in the Addison case; it must give more specific mean-
ing to a general statutory term in the light of a "variety of conditions and in-
dustries throughout the country." It was doubtless because of this lawmaking
aspect of the Commission's functions, so clearly illustrated by, but by no means
confined to, the trade practice conference rules, that Mr. Justice Sutherland
said in Humphrey's Ex'r (Rathbun) v. United States: 67 "In administering the
provisions of the statute in respect of 'unfair methods of competition'-that is
to say in filling in and administering the details embodied by that general
standard-the commission acts in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-
judicially." The fact that the Commission also acts in part quasi-judicially
-that trade practice conference rules defining unfair methods of competition
do not have the force of law except as they are applied by the Commission
in particular adversary proceedings--only adds to the appropriateness of ap-
lying the standard of review suggested in Gray v. Powell and its successors. 68
64. See HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMIixiSSION, c. 1 (1924).
65. See, for example, the opinions of Mr. }ustice McReynolds in Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 40 Sup. Ct. 572, 64 L. Ed. 993 (1920); 2nd Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 43 Sup. Ct. 450, 67 L. Ed.
747 (1923).
66. Federal Trade Comm'n v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 314, 54 Sup.
Ct. 423, 78 L. Ed. 814 (1934); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S.
683, 720, 68 Sup. Ct. 793, 92 L. Ed. 1010 (1948).
67. 295 U.S. 602, 628, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 79 L. Ed. 1611 (1935).
68. The view suggested above is, I believe, inconsistent with a recent suggestion
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It may be suggested, however, that the Federal Trade Commission Act
and comparable statutes assume a rule of conduct which is at least sufficiently
definite to justify a finding of violation of law with respect to conduct occurring
before the particular type of activity has been administratively defined as a
violation, either by prior decision or regulation; and that therefore the area
of discretion must be narrower, and the standard of review stricter, than in the
ordinary case of the clearly legislative regulation which operates entirely pro-
spectively and creates for the first time the possibility of violation. But the line
between prospective and retroactive legal effect is not so sharp that it neatly
separates quasi-legislative from quasi-judicial administrative action, or inter-
pretative from legislative regulations. Governmental action in terms wholly
prospective may attach significant and unforeseen consequences to past con-
duct; action in terms retrospective may be practically significant only as it lays
down a rule for future conduct. A finding of violation under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, for example, carries with it only the future inhibitions of a
cease-and-desist order; a finding of an unfair labor practice under the National
Labor Relations Act may carry with it, in addition, a substantial burden in
back-pay awards.69 The weight of these consequences, and the extent to which
they could be reasonably foreseen, are in the first instances matters of legisla-
tive judgment in laying down the substantive standard and in providing the
range of administrative weapons for its effectuation; in the second instance,
matters of administrative judgment, in the exercise of discretion to pick and
choose from the armory provided; and finally a matter of judicial determina-
that section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, properly interpreted, gives a
private right of action under federal law, irrespective of Commission action. See
Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 987 (1949). Such a
double-barreled enforcement of section 5, with cases arising in the courts independently
of the Commission, would produce the same kind of conflicts between judicial decisions
and original administrative decisions which helped to make the Dobson rule so difficult
to apply in the field of tax administration. Substantially the same question was pre-
sented to the Court with respect to the interpretation of the Interstate Commerce
Act when it conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission powers comparable
to those of the Federal Trade Commission, and was resolved against concurrent
jurisdiction for substantially the same reasons as those suggested above. Texas &
Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 441, 27 Sup. Ct. 350, 51 L. Ed.
553 (1907). There was, as a matter of fact, more statutory support for the notion
of concurrent jurisdiction in the Interstate Commerce Act at the time of the Abilene
case, than there is now in the Federal Trade Commission Act.
It might be suggested that there is already an element of concurrent jurisdiction
insofar as the Federal Trade Commission treats unfair methods of competition as
including violations of the Sherman Act, but even in this limited area, as Mr. Justice
Black's opinion in the Cenzent case points out, the Federal Trade Commission is not
concerned with exactly the same question as would be presented in a Sherman Act
proceeding. 333 U.S. at 708-09. See Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-trust Laws, 44 ILL.
L. RFv. 743, 761-62 (1950).
69. Unfair labor practices are more specifically defined under the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 158 (Supp. 1949), than are unfair methods of
competition under the Federal Trade Commission. Nevertheless, there is undoubtedly a
body of principle with respect to such practices developed by the Board within the
area of discretion left open to it. The recent decision of the Court in Colgate-Palmolive
Peit Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 70 Sup. Ct. 166 (1949), indicates, of
course, one of the limits of such discretion.
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tion insofar as the question is presented as to whether the particular weapon
was indeed within the armory provided and whether there was a rational basis
for the choice which the Administrator made.
All three aspects of the problem were dramatically illustrated in the now
famous Chenery cases, 70 which presented for review an order of the Securities
and Exchange Commission under the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935. The statute authorized the Commission to determine, in the first
instance, whether a voluntary plan of reorganization submitted for the pur-
poses of complying with the integration and simplification requirements of the
statute, was "fair and equitable." 71 The statute also provided for the sub-
mission of such a plan "In accordance with such rules and regulations or order
as the Commission may deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors or consumers .... ," 72 Finally, the statute
required the approval of the Commission for the issuance of securities pursuant
to such a plan, such approval to be withheld if the Commission found that the
issuance would be "detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors
or consumers" or would "result in an unfair or inequitable distribution of vot-
ing power." 73
The Chenery case had its inception when the Commission refused to ap-
prove a proposed voluntary plan of reorganization unless securities purchased
by the management while the plan was under consideration were denied par-
ticipation, except to the extent of cash in the amount of the purchase price
plus interest at 4%. This order the Court first refused to sustain on the ground
that it apparently rested upon the Commission's interpretation and application
of judicial decisions regarding the fiduciary obligations of the corporate man-
agement-decisions which the Court found inadequate to sustain the Commis-
sion's position.74 Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the ma-
jority, was equally explicit in recognizing that "In evolving standards of fair-
ness and equity, the Commission is not bound by settled judicial precedents";
and that "Congress certainly did not mean to preclude the formulation by the
Commission of standards expressing a more sensitive regard for what is right
and what is wrong than those prevalent at the time the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 became law." 75 Upon remand of the proceeding the
Commission reissued substantially the same order, but reformulated its opinion
in terms of the particular standards and objectives of the Public Utility Hold-
70. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 63 Sup. Ct.
454, 87 L. Ed. 626 (1943); Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 67 Sup. Ct. 1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947), 1 VAND. L. REv. 118.
71. Public Holding Company Act § 11(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79k(e) (1941).
72. Ibid.
73. Id. §§ 6, 7, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79f and 79g (1941).
74. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 63 Sup. Ct.
454, 87 L. Ed. 626 (1943).
75. 318 U.S. at 89.
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ing Company Act and its own knowledge and experience gained in the admin-
istration of this and similar statutes. Upon review the Supreme Court this
time sustained the Commission's action, Mr. Justice Jackson dissenting in an
opinion in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined.76
The grounds upon which Mr. Justice Murphy rested the opinion of the
Court are simple and plain enough. The Commission's, conclusion rested
"squarely in that area where administrative judgments are entitled to the great-
est amount of weight by appellate courts." It was "the product of administrative
experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the
statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts." It was,
in short, "an allowable judgment which we cannot disturb." 77 To Mr. Justice
Jackson, on the other hand, the Commission's action was "not conceivably
a-discharge of the Commission's duty to determine whether a proposed plan of
reorganization would be 'fair and equitable.'" This was so because it had
"nothing to do with the corporate structure, or the classes and amounts of
stock, or voting rights or dividend preferences," that is, "the impersonal finan-
cial or legal factors of the plan." 78 Rather it was a "personal deprivation deny-
ing particular persons the right to continue to own their stock and to exercise
its privileges." Neither was the order "one merely to regulate the future use
of property." Instead, "It literally takes valuable property away from its law-
ful owners for the benefit of other privateparties without full compensation.
•..,, 79 For present purposes, the most significant distinction suggested by Mr.
Justice Jackson is that between general regulations, applicable to future con-
duct, and individual orders issued after such conduct. The issuance of such a
prior regulation would apparently have presented for Mr. Justice Jackson quite
a different question, for he says:
76. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp. 332 U.S. 194, 67 Sup. Ct.
1575, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947).
77. 332 U.S. at 209.
78. Id. at 211. In suggesting that the Commission's determination did not fall
within the scope of authority delegated to determine whether a plan is "fair and
equitable" because it was concerned with the securities of particular people rather
than impersonal classes of securities, Mr. Justice Jackson skates on extremely thin ice.
Judicial determinations of whether a particular plan was fair and equitable have
not infrequently distinguished between different claimants of the same general class
on account of the way they had acquired their claims or conducted themselves in
relation to the reorganization. Cf. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S.
307, 59 Sup. Ct. 543, 83 L. Ed. 669 (1939); American Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 311
U.S. 138, 61 Sup. Ct. 157, 85 L. Ed. 91 (1940); First National Bank of Herkimer
v. Poland Union, 109 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1940). The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission had relied upon such cases in its first opinion, which the Court had
rejected as too legalistic. Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent suggests that the legalistic
analysis was at least pertinent to the problem of the statutory limits on the Commis-
sion's discretion. With respect to that particular problem, the Court could hardly hold
that the Commission's power to refuse to approve a plan as fair and equitable on
account of the circumstances of its formulation was less than that traditionally exer-
cised by a court of equity, without also throwing such questions open for independent
examination by the court in the subsequent judicial proceedings, an alternative which
the Court unanimously rejected in Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Central Illinois
Securities Corp., 69 Sup. Ct. 1377 (1949).
79. 332 U.S. at 211.
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"Whether, as matter of policy, corporate managers during reorganization should
be prohibited from buying or selling its stock, is not a question for us to decide.
But it is for us to decide whether, so long as no law or regulation prohibits them
from buying, their purchases may be forfeited, or not, in the discretion of the Com-
mission." 8
But was the distinction in the Chenery case between prospective and retro-
spective action really as simple as Mr. Justice Jackson apparently assumes?
Technically at least, the Commission's order looked entirely to the future,
first in refusing to allow the original plan to go into effect and then in approv-
ing the amended plan. The order did, of course, attach significance to past
acts, but in this respect it did not differ from many types of administrative
action which involve a large amount of administrative discretion and which also
seriously limit private rights, hopes or expectations-the granting, renewal or
revocation of licenses, for example. The ultimate issue was whether denial of
the expectation of those who purchased securities without warning that they
would be classified differently from other holders of the same securities, was
reasonably in furtherance of those statutory objectives implied by the standards
"fair and equitable" or "detrimental to the public interest and the interest of
investors." The form and timing of the Commission's action was relevant in
this connection-both insofar as it imposed individual hardship that might
have been avoided and insofar as it amoufited to locking the barn after the
horse was stolen-but these were at most factors to be weighed in determining
whether there was indeed a rational basis for the Commission's judgment.8'
However that ultimate question may be resolved, it seems clear that the stand-
ard of review which the court was called upon to apply was essentially the
same whether the Commission proceeded to attack the problem by a series of
individual orders in particular situations, or by the isuance of a general regula-
tion to be subsequently applied to individual cases.
Entirely apart then from its controversial aspects, the Chenery cases il-
lustrate how Congress may, for the purpose of effectuating a delegation of
authority to implement broad statutory standards, provide an administrative
agency with a choice of either the general regulation or particular order ap-
proach, or a combination of both. Whichever method the agency chooses, the
same fundamental elements of administrative discretion are present, and the
same fundamental standards of judicial review must be applied-whether the
agency has acted within the scope of the delegation and whether there was a
rational basis for the exercise of its judgment.82 Similarly when the agency is
80. Id. at 216.
81. In this connection see Jaffe, Administrative Findings or The Ameer i; America,
34 CoRmELL L.Q. 473, 485-91 (1949); Notes, 62 HAv. L. REv. 478 (1949), 56 HARV.
L. REv. 1002 (1943).
82. Another example of this problem of choice among alternative methods
may be found in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 63 Sup. Ct.
997, 87 L. Ed. 1344 (1943), where the Court considered the validity of the chain
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authorized to act only by individual order, whether it be an exemption order,
as in Gray v. Powell or a cease-and-desist order under the Federal Trade Coin-
mission Act, the same area of discretion may be present and the same general
standard of judicial review be applicable. This is not to say-as indeed the
Chenery case well illustrates-that exactly the same factors press equally for
consideration no matter which method is involved. Individual orders may be
particularly susceptible to attack, either because they come without previous
warning, or because they are inconsistent with other orders in comparable
situations. General regulations on the other hand, may be vulnerable to the
charge that they are too rigid and do not allow enough play for significant in-
dividual differences. But these are exactly the considerations which the Court
must evaluate whenever it has to apply the rational-basis rule-trying as best
it can to avoid both usurpation of administrative authority and abnegation of
judicial responsibility.
III
If the foregoing analysis is sound, it becomes readily apparent that the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act would, at the most, require a
restatement of the principle under discussion. In this connection particular em-
phasis has been placed upon the opening sentence of section 10(e) of the
Act which reads: "So far as necessary to decision and where presented the re-
viewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions and determifie the meaning or applicability of the
terms of any agency action." 83 To the extent that the rational-basis rule means
only that when two conflicting interpretations of a statutory provision are per-
missible under the language and relevant legislative history, the court will
broadcasting regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission.
The Commission, in effect, established the rules for its own guidance in granting,
renewing and revoking licenses. How such regulations would fit into the Administrative
Procedure Act is also a nice question. As an original proposition, it would have seemed
to me that they were general "statements of policy" within the meaning of, and
therefor explicitly excepted from, section 4 of the Act, but in the light of the decision
of the Court in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 62 Sup.
Ct. 1194, 86 L. Ed. 1563 (1942), holding them subject to review in advance of specific
application, the opposite result is indicated. But it is even more surprising that the
Court held in the National Broadcasting Co. case that the validity of the regulations
must be determined on the record of the Commission's hearing. This seems unsound
because there was nothing in the Federal Communications Act or any other applicable
principle of law requiring the Commission to hold a hearing before issuing the regu-
lations; the hearing was a discretionary procedure adopted by the Commission for its
own guidance. Similarly the type of hearing now provided for in Section 4 of the
Administrative Procedure Act is not intended to provide the basis for judicial review
of the validity of regulations, any more than congressional committee hearings provide
the record for judicial review of the validity of legislation, even though matter pre-
sented at such hearings may be relevant to the determination of validity. The decisions
cited by Mr. Justice Frankfurter oil this point in the National Broadcasting Co. case
(319 U.S. at 227) are inapposite because they involved judicial review of orders before
the issuance of which an administrative hearing was required.
83. 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009(e) (Supp. 1949).
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give decisive weight to a rational administrative judgment as to which inter-
pretation will best effectuate the statutory objectives, there is no conflict at
all with the quoted language of the Act. Despite the decisive weight given to the
administrative judgment with respect to evaluation of practical consequences,
the court itself, under this view, takes full responsibility for the ultimate de-
termination with respect to the meaning of the statute. From the broader
standpoint of statutory interpretation in general, the significance of such re-
liance upon administrative judgment lies in finding another avenue of escape
from the futility of a metaphysical search for a nonexistent legislative intent.
When language is ambiguous and legislative history fragmentary and incon-
clusive, an administrative judgment based upon a reasoned examination of
the problem in the light of both the particular facts and the broad statutory ob-
jectives is likely to provide the most reliable guide to the effectuation of those
objectives. If acceptance of this judgment must be reconciled with a theory
of legislative intention, it might be said that the legislature presumably in-
tended the statute to achieve its apparent objectives to the fullest extent prac-
ticable within the limits clearly defined, and that the best judges of practica-
bility are those to whom is entrusted the primary responsibility for adminis-
tration.
8 4
But, as has been suggested, the rational-basis rule of judicial review has
a more distinctive function to perform in recognition of an administrative
judgment which is essentially legislative or discretionary in character. When
administrative action involves the exercise of delegated authority to imple-
ment broad statutory standards, whether by general regulation as in the Ad-
dison case, or by specific order, as in Gray v. Powell, the area of administrative
judgment is no more aptly described as statutory interpretation, than a simi-
lar exercise of judgment in the grant or denial of a license or the establish-
ment of a reasonable rate for the future.8 5 Such an exercise of judgment is
hardly a determination of law within the meaning of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act; and even if it were, it would clearly be within the scope of the
exception provided in the introductory clause of section 10 for "agency action
84. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has recently objected to the use of the term "legisla-
tive intent." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COL. L. REv.
526, 538-39 (1947). But the analysis suggested fits as well into his formulation: "Legis-
lation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect
a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government. . . That is what the judge
must seek and effectuate. ..."
85. It may be suggested that administrative action in applying broad statutory
terms to particular situations is essentially no different from judicial action in the
application of broad statutes, such as the anti-trust laws, for example. This only
emphasizes that there is an element of legislation in judicial action but it does not
mean that the legislature when it delegates some of its power to administrative authori-
ties as distinguished from courts thereby invests the delegated power with all the
attributes of the judicial function. This is .well illustrated by comparing the modem
functions of public utility commissions in determining the reasonableness of rates,
either for the past or for the future, with judicial enforcement of the traditional
common law obligation of public utilities to charge reasonable rates.
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... by law committed to agency discretion." 86 There is, of course, always an
underlying question of statutory interpretation with respect to whether, and
how much, discretion has in fact been delegated. That underlying question can
only be determined in the future, as in the past, by painstaking examination
of the particular legislation, using all the available guides to meaning, includ-
ing the administrative judgment as to the practical consequences involved. To
those inclined to fear that acceptance of this view might lead to unbecoming
judicial abdication, it may be some comfort to note that even those Justices
who have been most insistent upon the rational-basis rule have never been at a
loss for methods of correction when the Administrator has, in their view,
strayed from the path of reason or beyond the bounds of his authority.
86. The exact language is: "Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review
or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion." I can find nothing
in the legislative history to suggest that this exception does not mean what it says.
Mr. Dickinson appears to find such evidence in the fact that the proviso included
in the draft bill prepared by the minority of the Acheson committee was not embodied
in the Act-to wit: "Provided, however, that upon such review due weight shall be
accorded the experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and legislative
policy of the agency involved, as well as the discretionary authority conferred upon it."
Dickinson, supra note-8 at 585-86. Mr. Dickinson overlooks the fact that the sug-
gestions prepared by the minority of the Acheson committee called for review of "find-
ings, inferences, or conclusions of fact." The specific inclusion of "inferences" made
the qualification with respect to technical competence particularly appropriate, See
REP. ATr'Y GEN. Comm. AD. PRoc. 246-47 (1947). The separate statement of the
views of the minority members leaves no doubt that they were interested in spelling
out their conception of the substantial evidence rule, so as to assure a real review of
the facts as distinguished from the law, by including specifically subordinate inferences
of fact, as well as ultimate findings, qualified however, by appropriate respect for ex-
perience, technical competence and specialized knowledge. See Id. at 211. The attempt
to spell all this out was finally abandoned, except for inclusion of the reference to "the
whole record."
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